Researchers have used dierent approaches and techniques to measure bank performance but most of these studies have been restricted to developed economies. Among the few papers that exist for developing economies, either eciency or productivity of banks have been estimated based on which inferences about the banking industry have been made. In this paper we estimate eciency of Indian banks and then estimate a measure of productivity that includes an eciency term. Following this comprehensive measure, we nd that banks have improved their performance during the period 1986 to 2000 in terms of both eciency and productivity. Surprisingly, foreign banks have been the worst performers throughout the period as compared with state owned and private domestic banks.
Introduction
Recent years have seen an explosion in research on bank performance across the globe. 2 While researchers have used a variety of approaches to measure bank performance, most of the studies have been restricted to developed economies. Among the few papers that exist for developing economies, the two common approaches to measuring performance are to estimate either eciency or productivity of banks based on which inferences about the banking industry are made. The same is true for papers on Indian banking. In other words, these papers have either estimated eciency (using a frontier technique) or separately estimated productivity (ignoring the eciency factor). In this paper, we estimate eciency of Indian banks and then, following Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000) , estimate a measure of productivity that includes the eciency term. The results from such an analysis are quite interesting. We nd that both eciency as well as productivity of foreign banks have been consistently lower than those of domestic banks. Among the domestic banks, the public banks beneted the most from the deregulation process and had higher eciency than private banks. In terms of productivity, private banks appear to have performed better, driven mostly by technical progress.
Existing research on the comparative performance of foreign banks and domestic banks show conicting conclusions. It has been found that foreign banks are more protable than domestic banks in developed countries while it is the other way round in developing countries (Claessens, Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 2000) . To cite some country-specic studies, for the U.S. it has been observed that foreign banks are less ecient than domestic banks (Hasan and Hunter, 1996) . But other studies have found that foreign banks are nearly as ecient as domestic banks in developed countries other than the U.S. (Vennet, 1996 ; Hasan and LozanoVivas, 1998). For the transition economies of Central and Eastern Europe, it has been found that foreign banks were less ecient than domestically owned private banks and state-owned banks (Yildirim and Philippatos, 2002) . In the case of Latin America, some studies have found that foreign banks were more productive than domestic banks (Barajas, Steiner and Salazar, 2000) while some others reported little dierence between the performance of the foreign and domestic banks (Crystal, Dages and Goldberg, 2002) .
In this paper we try to compare the performance of foreign banks operating in India with the domestic banks. India provides a unique case study whereby banking industry is charac terized by a mixed ownership structure and the deregulation of the industry in the nineties had paved the way for a level playing eld between the various ownership groups. Existing studies on bank performance in India appear to be insucient in comprehensively comparing the performance of foreign banks with domestic banks. Kumbhakar and Sarkar (2003a) estimated Total Factor Productivity (TFP) growth and its components using a generalized shadow cost function approach for public and private banks from 1986 to 1997. This paper did not allow for ineciency eects in the analysis. On the other hand, Kumbhakar and Sarkar (2003b) and Shanmugam and Das (2004) estimated bank eciency using various stochastic frontiers but did not study productivity. It may be mentioned that the present paper uses a large period of data (viz. 1985 to 2000) to assess the relative performance of dierent bank groups in India. The data period allows us to also study the impact of deregulation on bank performance. Essentially, the empirical estimation of the paper proceeds in two steps. The rst step deals with estimation of eciency using stochastic frontier analysis. In the next step, measures of productivity are computed based on the stochastic frontier estimates.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief overview of the banking industry in India. Section 3 discusses the econometric methodology we employ. Section 4 introduces the data used in the paper and formalizes the econometric specication.
Section 5 and Section 6 are devoted to discussions of the results from the analysis of eciency and productivity, respectively. Finally, Section 7 summarizes and concludes. banking industry in India is characterized by the coexistence of state-owned or public sector banks, domestic private incumbents (or private banks), foreign banks and domestic private entrants (or new private banks). Historically, the industry was dominated by the public sector banks while the activities of the private sector (both domestic and foreign) were severely controlled by India's Central Bank, the Reserve Bank of India. However falling protability and ineciency in the banking system precipitated the rst set of banking sector reforms in 1992 that facilitated entry deregulation, branch de-licensing, deregulation of interest rates, and operational freedom for public sector banks. Consequent to these reforms, 9 new private banks started operations in the mid-nineties.
A level playing eld was created by subjecting all bank groups to the same prudential norms, such as Cash Reserve Ratio (CRR) and Statutory Liquidity Ration (SLR), while also introducing capital adequacy norms and income recognition and provisioning norms. In the backdrop of the South-East Asian Crisis and the Basel Committee recommendations, the`second generation reforms' of the late nineties imposed stricter capital adequacy and Non-Performing Assets (NPAs) norms, market risk on government securities, and introduced Assets-Liabilities management and Risk management guidelines.Thus the banking reforms, initiated since 1992 were intended to impart enhanced eciency, productivity and protability into the system. Even in this level playing eld, the industry is still dominated by a few large banks and entry is still closely monitored by the regulator. This has encouraged strategic competition among banks and the market structure is closer to that of oligopoly. Hence, it is in this backdrop that we attempt to assess the relative performance of the public sector banks with the domestic private and the foreign banks.
Econometric Methodology
The disadvantage of using regression models in studying bank performance (as in Kumbhakar and Sarkar, 2003a ) is that such models assume that all banks are equally ecient which is quite a strong restriction. It is widely accepted that large variations in banking data necessitates the application of frontier analysis. In this paper we employ the parametric method of stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) because of its ability to capture error in the data that may arise out of luck, data problems, or other measurement errors. 3 SFA was developed independently by Aigner, Lovell and Schmidt (1977) and Meeusen and van den Broeck (1977) . Since then, the original specication has been modied and extended in a number of ways. In this paper we will be using the Battese and Coelli (1995) methodology of stochastic frontier analysis which is popular in the literature due to several advantages 3 The other popular frontier technique is the Data Envelopment Analysis which is a non-parametric method that does not allow for any random error.
that it oers compared to traditional methodologies. It allows simultaneous estimation of the frontier function and the ineciency function in a single maximum likelihood procedure which avoids the theoretical problems of the traditional two-step approaches (Battese and Coelli, 1995) . Moreover, it is easily amenable to analysis of panel data and allows for timevarying ineciency. As regards the specication of the frontier, banking being a multi-product industry, we take recourse to the cost function for estimating eciency. The Battese and Coelli (1995) model for a cost frontier is briey outlined as follows. Assuming that a producer's objective is to minimize cost, the cost frontier based on panel data can be represented as:
where i indexes banks and t indexes time. As for the variables, C is cost, Y is the output vector and W is a vector of factor prices (all variables measured in logs). The random error, V it $ iid N (0; V 2 ), and the ineciency factor, U it $ non-negative truncation of independently distributed N ( it ; U 2 ), where, it = Z it . 4 The ineciency model is thus specied as:
where Z it is an 1xp vector of variables which may inuence the ineciency of a rm and is a px1 vector of parameters to be estimated. 
Data and Econometric Specication
The rst step in modeling bank behavior is to decide whether deposits form part of output or input of a bank. We follow the value added approach (Berger and Humphrey, 1992 ; Grifell- 4 Because we are pooling banks with dierent sizes, the data may be characterized by heteroskedasticity. This may lead to biased estimates in a stochastic frontier model where one part of the error term is distributed asymmetrically (Caudill, Ford and Gropper, 1995; Hadri, 1999) . Christopoulos and Tsionas (2001) have discussed this issue specically in the context of banking. According to Wang (2003) , the heteroskedasticity of U can be modeled through a non-constant or a non-constant U 2 or both. The approach of Battese and Coelli (1995) is to make observation specic and we follow this since the other approaches lead to loss of too many degrees of freedom.
Tatje and Lovell, 1996; Berg et al., 1993) that treats deposits and loans as output. 5 Thus, our output vector consists of value of xed deposits (FD), saving deposits (SD), current deposits (CD), investments (INV) and loans and advances (ADV). Apart from these, we also include the number of branches (B) as an output variable. Branches can proxy for the quality of services (Berg et al., 1993) and therefore ignoring branches amounts to omitting a costly service that provides transactions convenience to customers (Grifell-Tatje and Lovell, 1996).
Number of branches also proxies for the size of bank transactions. This is important since the deposit and loan outputs of a bank should be ideally measured in terms of number of deposit and loan accounts produced by a bank rather than their value (Grifell-Tatje and Lovell, 1996).
Given the unavailability of the number of accounts data in India, while we employ the value of deposits and loans of each bank as output, it might be appropriate to use the number of branches as an imperfect control for the size of transactions. Labor (L) and Capital (K) are the two variable inputs. The dependent variable is total operating cost (C), which is the sum of labor and capital costs (it does not include interest expended).
Price of labor (w L ) is obtained by dividing total establishment expenses by total number of employees. Price of capital (w K ) is obtained by dividing the total capital expenditure by total xed assets. All nominal variables are converted to real by measuring them at 1993-94 prices. The data is taken from various issues of Financial Analysis of Banks and Performance Highlights of Banks published by the Indian Banks' Association. We use data on 27 public sector banks (public banks, henceforth), 25 domestic private sector banks (private banks, henceforth), 22 foreign banks, and 9 new domestic private sector banks (new private banks, henceforth) that started operating after deregulation. New private banks are the only entrants in this study and their data is available from 1996. 6 In selecting the old private banks and foreign banks, we used data availability as the criterion of inclusion in our sample. 15 years of data is taken from the year 1986 to 2000.
Note that we dier from the existing cost-based studies in Indian banking (e.g. Kumbhakar ways. First, we are including both foreign and new private (entrants) banks as separate 5 Indeed most studies on Indian banks have used this approach (see Das, 1997; Kumbhakar and Sarkar, 2003a; Kumbhakar and Sarkar, 2003b) . The value added approach also appears to be intuitively more appealing for Indian banking where deposit mobilization is one of main the objectives of banks. Moreover, considering deposits as output takes into account the quality of services provided by a bank. 6 In our set of 83 banks, none of the foreign banks that entered the industry after entry deregulation could be included because of considerations of data availability. groups in the analysis. This allows us to compare the performance of foreign banks and domestic entrants with the domestic incumbents. Second, we look at the role of size in determining eciency. Third, we consider each category of deposit as a separate element in the output vector since they are inherently dierent in characteristics and banks' strategy regarding each category might be dierent. Fourth, our estimates of TFP growth include a component for eciency growth obtained from the SFA, which has not been considered by any of the existing studies.
We adopt the translog (transcendental logarithm) form which is a second order approxima- of the regressor matrix. T is year which represents change in ineciency over time. DEREG is a deregulation dummy that takes the value one for years 1993 and above, and zero otherwise. 7 Deregulation is expected to have reduced ineciency in the banking sector. SIZE is taken to be log of total assets (i.e. sum of INV and ADV). The coecient of SIZE would indicate the 7 The year 1993 was selected as the deregulation year because it yielded the maximum value of likelihood function compared to the other years and also the plot of ineciencies without any deregulation dummy showed the sharpest kink at 1993. This is expected because implementation of the recommendations of the rst Narasimham Committee, that triggered o banking reforms in India, started in January 1992 (Kumbhakar and Sarkar, 2003b) . eect of bank size on ineciency.
PUB, PVT and NEWPVT are ownership dummies that take value one if the bank belongs to the public sector, private sector and new private sector respectively. The only other sector is foreign, which becomes the base for interpreting the ownership dummies. As discussed earlier, ineciency is expected to vary across ownership groups because of the dierence in governance structures. Interactive terms among the above variables are expected to indicate how each explanatory factor may be aecting ineciency through interaction with another.
Empirical Findings on Eciency
We estimate the cost frontier twice, once without including any bank group dummies in the frontier and next with group dummies. The former (which we will refer to as Model 1) provides a common frontier for the banking industry relative to which the ineciencies are estimated whereas the latter (which we will refer to as Model 2) makes the frontier specic to environmental conditions in each bank group. The results of the estimation for the common frontier and the group-specic frontier are summarized in Tables 1 and 2 respectively. Since the main focus of the analysis is on ineciency and its determinants, we do not discuss the estimated coecients of the cost frontier in details. However we note that while the coecients of xed deposits and branches are positive as expected, it is not so for the output variables.
But these signs themselves are not of much concern, since the theoretical requirement is that the cost elasticity of output should be positive, which we do obtain (with a few exceptions) when we consider all the interaction terms and compute the corresponding elasticities.
( Tables 1 and 2 here) Before we discuss the estimated parameters of the ineciency function and present the ineciency estimates we ought to verify statistically whether there is any need to use the stochastic frontier model framework and whether bank-specic ineciency eects are at all present in the cost function of Indian banking. This can be done by rst performing a composite test of = 0 =... = 13 =0. The test uses a generalized likelihood ratio (LR henceforth) which follows a mixed chi-squared distribution (Coelli and Battese, 1996) . A generalized LR test is required since can not take negative values and hence the test must be performed as a one-sided test. Moreover, the LR test statistic does not have a chi-square distribution because the restriction denes a point on the boundary of the parameter space.
In this case the likelihood ratio statistic follows a mixed chi-square distribution with degrees of freedom equal to the number of parameters.
The generalized likelihood ratio test rejected the above hypothesis (LR test statistic of the one-sided error is 692.29 for Model 1 and is 711.17 for Model 2, both of which are greater than the appropriate mixed-Chi square statistic available in Table 1 Table 1 of Kodde and Palm, 1986 ). Hence our tests suggest that indeed bank specic ineciency eects are present and that such ineciencies are better modeled within a stochastic frontier framework.
Moving to the behavior of ineciency, from Tables 1 and 2 we observe the role of determinants of ineciency from the last three columns of the tables. The impact of each variable of the Z vector on ineciency can be understood by collecting and computing all terms in @E(U it ) @Z kit from the ineciency equation. The coecients of most of the terms containing T in the ineciency model are negative. In fact, collecting all relevant terms it has been observed that the impact of T on ineciency is negative in both models 1 and 2, which suggests that during the sample period, cost eciency increased over time on an average for the industry.
However, deregulation led to an increase in cost ineciency. 8 This is indicated by a positive and signicant coecient of DEREG in a model with only T and DEREG*T as regressors in the ineciency equation. This suggests that deregulation led to a fall in cost eciency, although there was a temporal increase in cost eciency during the entire period.
The role of ownership in determining cost ineciency is provided by the group dummies.
We observe that most of the terms containing the public, private and new private dummies are signicant in both models 1 and 2, indicating that ownership is indeed a signicant determinant of ineciency. The relative performance of the bank groups would be analyzed later by presenting gures of average cost eciency across groups. The next question we turn to is the role of size in cost ineciency. In other words, are big banks more ecient or less ecient than small banks? Moreover, since public banks are on an average bigger than the other bank groups, it is natural to ask whether it is the eect of size that tends to show up through the public bank dummy. Collecting all terms containing SIZE and computing its impact on ineciency revealed a positive relationship in both models, thereby implying that size adversely aects cost eciency.
Next we discuss the behavior of cost eciency in both models. From the bank-wise estimates of eciency, we computed the group-wise eciency estimates for each year by taking a simple mean over the constituent banks of each group. 9 These mean eciencies are reported in Table 3 and are presented graphically in Figure 1 . We observe for Model 1 that in most of the years, private banks appear to have performed better in terms of cost eciency than the public, new private and foreign banks in that order. Although the immediate impact of deregulation was to reduce cost eciency, public banks were gradually able to take advantage of the deregulation process better than the private banks and outperformed them in the later years. Compared to the other groups, new private banks appear to have achieved a rapid rise in cost eciency. This may have happened due to their late entry into the industry because of which they had the advantage of not carrying any baggage from the past, as was the case with the other groups. Therefore the new private banks may have successfully managed their business at lower operating costs than the other groups. The striking part of the results is that foreign banks appeared to have the lowest cost eciency. This is contrary to popular perception in India and we try to explain this result later. However in Model 2 we observe that public banks have higher cost eciency than private banks throughout the sample period.Foreign and new private banks come next in the order.
( Table 3 and Figure 1 here)
The above results can be interpreted as follows. First, the decline of cost ineciency over the entire sample period is consistent with Kumbhakar and Sarkar (2003b) who found that although cost ineciency declined over time, the rate of decline slowed down subsequent to deregulation. It is expected that over time, with increased competitive pressure and entry of new banks, intermediation costs will come down and thereby cost eciency of the banking sector will rise. Banks, in general, have been able to contain operating costs, and have therefore moved towards the best banks (that comprise the frontier) over the entire time 9 Weighted means did not change the results qualitatively.
period. However the immediate impact of deregulation was to increase cost ineciency.
Deregulation brought about substantial changes in technology and business practices, that is expected to shift the cost frontier inwards. However individual banks may have been slow to respond and reorient their strategies to the changing circumstances. But over time they are expected to catch up with the`best' banks comprising the frontier. Thus, although eciency decreased around the time of deregulation, over time and overall, there has been a rise.
Second, private banks are more cost ecient than public banks in the pre-deregulation period when compared in a common frontier. In this respect, the pre-deregulation situation is consistent with the property rights hypothesis and public choice theory. 10 However public banks beneted more from deregulation and outperformed the private banks subsequent to deregulation in terms of their cost eciency. On the other hand when compared to groupspecic frontiers, private banks appeared to be less cost ecient than public banks even in the pre-deregulation period. In other words while there were private banks lying close to the industry frontier prior to deregulation, yet most of the public banks were closer to thè best' banks in their own group. However subsequent to deregulation, not only did public banks continue to be close to their own frontier, there were more public banks comprising the industry frontier than private banks. Thus overall, private banks appear to have been less cost ecient and more so in the post-deregulation period. This could be because private banks took the lead in investing in new revenue generating practices which led to a lot of additional costs. These were in the form of computerization of branches, setting up of Advanced Ledger Posting Machine (ALPM) branches, computer training of employees, upgradation of technology etc. Thus, while the private banks might have made these costly investments with an eye on earning higher revenues, they appear to have lost out in terms of cost eciency. Provision of better quality of output may lead to enhanced revenues for banks even while they take a hit in terms of cost eciency. Berger and Mester (2003) refer to this as the`increasing quality hypothesis'.
Foreign banks were the worst performers in terms of cost eciency in both models. The reasons for this could be that foreign banks incur huge expenditure in paying high salaries to employees. A survey conducted on 62 banks by the Reserve Bank of India found that as on March 31, 2002 , sta expenses per employee in million Indian Rupees was the highest for foreign banks at 9.16, followed by new private banks at 3.04, public banks at 2.53 and private banks at 2.13 (Reserve Bank of India, 2002). 11 In fact an overwhelming proportion of employees in foreign banks are highly paid ocers as compared with domestic banks which employ proportionately more clerks and subordinates. Foreign banks also incur huge expenditure on costly real estate being mostly based in urban and metropolitan areas. Moreover, the public and private banks have a historical advantage of having established business structures and infrastructure in India which most of the new foreign banks do not.
Further, the use of technology is much more in the case of foreign banks which may lead to huge costs. This is evidenced by the above mentioned survey which showed that foreign banks were ahead of the public and private banks in terms of Information Technology use. Moreover, the foreign banks operating in India are not listed in the Indian stock markets.
Hence the market forces that usually cause private entitites to be more ecient than public entities may not be operating on foreign banks. 12 However, while foreign banks did badly on the cost front, they might actually have incurred new costs in order to hunt for newer sources of revenue (`increasing quality hypothesis'). In fact, both foreign and private banks tried to garner newer sources of revenue, for which they undertook additional expenditure thereby taking them away from the cost frontier.
Thus, subsequent to deregulation, cost eciency of public banks has been higher relative to other bank groups. With the introduction of sucient deregulation, public banks could improve their performance in terms of cost eciency and outperform their private counterparts. On the other hand, as mentioned already, the improvement in cost eciency of public banks vis-a-vis private banks could also have happened because the private banks incurred 11 The exchange rate was 48.8 Rupees to a Dollar at end-year 2002. 12 While it may be true that the scrips of only a few private banks are actively traded in the stock market, the process of listing itself requires the disclosure of certain parameters as mandated by Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI), which is the capital market regulator. These disclosure norms may lead to market pressure on the listed banks to improve their performance. a lot of costs in attempting to provide superior quality of services with the expectation of higher revenues. Thus, the role of competition appears to be strong in terms of aecting performance of banks in terms of cost eciency.
Lastly, bigger banks were seen to be less cost ecient. This indicates that it might be more dicult to manage costs in bigger banks, which gets reected in lower cost eciency.
This result has been reported earlier in the literature. For example, Christopoulos, Lolos and Tsionas (2002) found that in Greece, larger banks are less cost ecient than their smaller counterparts. They attribute it to the fact that larger banks tend to have inecient management, low sta motivation and strict labor relations. Moreover, bigger banks have a greater burden of the cost of maintaining an extended branch network which caters to deposit mobilization but does not contribute to selling priced products. This may be true for Indian banks as well.
So far we have estimated cost eciency of Indian banks. This is only one measure of bank performance and we need to compute productivity to complete the picture. In fact a low (high) value of one of these two measures does not necessarily imply a low (high) value of the other. Productivity consists of scale eects and technical change eects, in addition to eciency growth. Hence, a bank with low cost eciency could be reaping scale economies so as to have a high productivity growth. Alternatively, it could also have higher productivity growth through a shift in the frontier (technical change) due to implementation of better technology. Thus a study of performance would remain incomplete without an analysis of productivity growth. We turn to these issues in the following section.
6 Productivity Analysis TFP of any rm can be intuitively understood as a measure of output produced relative to input usage. Eciency change, as estimated in the previous section, can be viewed as one of the components of a broader measure of TFP growth. According to Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000) , until very recently, econometric models of productivity growth had ignored the role of eciency growth. Productivity growth was supposed to consist of shifts in production technology i.e. technical change, and also the biases of technical change and the structure of the technology i.e. scale economies. Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000) give a measure of TFP based on the cost frontier consisting of the above two components as well as eciency growth, which we discuss below.
The Divisia index of TFP growth for multiple outputs can be written as: 13 
_
In this study, we construct indices of each component of TFP, i.e. T F P i (t) = T F P i (t 1)[1 + _ T F P i (t)] and it is set at 100 for the rst year. The mean _ T F P i are calculated for each bank group for each year. Based on these means, T F P i are computed for each bank group 13 Note that the Tornqvist index is a discrete approximation of the continuous Divisia index.
for each year. T F P is computed in a similar fashion. 14 Once again we report our estimates based on both a common frontier (Model 1) and group-specic frontiers (Model 2). It also needs to be noted here that the TFP gures for new private banks are not strictly comparable with those of the other groups since the initial year for this group is 1996 at which their TFP is set to be 100, whereas the initial year for all other groups is 1986. The mean values for all bank groups are reported in Tables 4 and 5 for Model 1 and in Tables 6 and 7 Their study however did not have a cost frontier, whereas our results show that the cost frontier has indeed shifted inwards which gets manifested as technical change.
Tables 4 to 7 also report the movement of mean T F P 2 which gives the scale eect compo- Tables 4 to 7 also report the movement of mean T F P 3 which gives the eciency growth component. While we have studied the behavior of cost eciency levels of bank groups in Table 3 , T F P 3 represents an index based on the growth of the same eciencies. Unlike in the levels, we nd that foreign banks have mostly outperformed public and private banks in terms of eciency growth in both models 1 and 2. However, as in the levels, public banks appear to have performed better than the private banks especially in the post-deregulation period. While new private banks are not strictly comparable with the other groups, their performance in terms of T F P 3 shows a high growth in eciency as was evident from the eciency levels in Figure 1 . When the indices were recalculated for 1996-2000 with base at 1996, new private banks turned out to be the best performers in this period.
The composite TFP index is also reported in Tables 4 to 7 while the same is plotted in Figure 2 . This gives the overall performance of banks in terms of TFP. 
Conclusion
This paper studied eciency and productivity of scheduled commercial banks in India during the period 1986 to 2000 using a stochastic cost frontier approach. SFA gave us estimates of cost ineciency and its determinants. Then, using the parameter and eciency estimates from the frontiers, various measures of productivity and their components were computed.
Implications were drawn in terms of the role of ownership, competition and deregulation. Nevertheless, foreign banks have been poor performers in terms of cost eciency and productivity. This could be due to the costly practices followed by foreign banks in India.
Moreover, deposits being a small proportion of their total liabilities may lead to the low TFP.
On the other hand, performance of new private banks in terms of cost eciency and TFP appears to have been the best in the industry. This is not a surprising result, since new private banks being recent entrants in the industry did not suer from the burden of old costs incurred due to various factors like loss making branches, over-stang etc., as was the case with the incumbents. As a result, while they could compete with the other groups in terms of banking services, they could also manage to keep operating costs under control.
In sum, one lesson that emerges from the empirical exercises is that intermediation costs have declined in Indian banking and total factor productivity has increased. In other words, deregulation has achieved the desired results. This is true even for public banks who appear to have beneted from the increased competition resulting from entry, and performed as well as private banks and sometimes better. More signicantly, public banks have performed considerably better than foreign banks. However this result is not sucient to say that state ownership is superior to private (domestic or foreign) ownership. It may be that less costly practices of the public banks get reected in lower protability. Moreover there may be scope of improvement in the public banks themselves as compared with where they presently stand.
Whether there can be strategies for public sector banks to perform even better and what role does this leave for foreign banks to play in India is left for our future research. 
